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NESTED ETHICS: A TALE OF TWO CULTURES
Milton C. Regan, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As law firms have become larger and more complex,1 many of
them have adopted more sophisticated programs to ensure that lawyers
in the firm comply with their professional responsibilities.2 These
programs attempt to achieve more consistent behavior across the firm by
relying on specifically designated ethics experts who take the lead in
establishing standard procedures that coordinate and reduce reliance on
individual discretion.3 Aside from producing greater uniformity, such
procedures also lessen reliance on the probity of individual lawyers. This
reflects awareness of the powerful way that circumstances can shape
behavior, particularly in large organizations. We can think of these
procedures and policies as constituting the basic elements of a law firm’s
ethical infrastructure. This term sometimes is used to encompass a
broader set of initiatives, but for analytical purposes, I want to use it in
the narrower sense.

* McDevitt Professor of Jurisprudence and Co-Director, Center for the Study of the Legal
Profession, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Susan Fortney and Scott
Killingsworth for helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also would like to acknowledge a grant
from the Law School Admission Council for a project on law firm culture that has prompted the
ideas that I discuss in this Article.
1. “Law firms generally can be described as tending toward progressively formal
management and internal specialization as firms move from smaller and collegial to larger, more
bureaucratic forms.” Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691,
694 (2002). [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure].
2. Id. at 692.
3. Id. at 706-07.
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In recent years, organizations have come to appreciate that
procedures and policies designed to promote ethical behavior may have
limited effect if employees do not internalize the values that underlie
them.4 Scholars suggest that organizations need to combine a focus on
deterrence with an approach that emphasizes management’s
commitment to ethical values.5 As Lynn Sharp Paine describes, these
values “reflect important organizational obligations and widely shared
aspirations that appeal to the organization’s members.”6 This approach
assumes that employees desire to act on the basis of these values and
that they will be motivated to do so if they believe that the organization
takes them seriously. Management therefore must ensure that rules that
prescribe behavior are not mere formalities because people in positions
of authority disregard and show little respect for them. Attention to this
dimension of organizational life reflects an effort to promote an ethical
culture that complements and reinforces a firm’s ethical infrastructure.
While ethical culture is sometimes described more broadly than a focus
on the values embodied in an organization’s ethical program, for
analytical purposes, I want to use this term in the narrower sense.
Based on this account of the evolution of law firm ethics programs,
we can conceptualize the components that influence ethical behavior as
nested inside one another. The first level is the individual who engages
in decision-making, who may receive advice from colleagues who act
informally to provide ethical guidance. The second level, which provides
the larger context for the first, is a firm’s ethical infrastructure, which
attempts in various ways to shape and channel that behavior. The third
level, which provides the larger context for the first two, is a firm’s
ethical culture. This can prompt an individual to embrace ethical values
to which a firm is committed, which provides intrinsic motivation to
comply with the procedures and policies that make up the firm’s
infrastructure. These relationships can be depicted in this way:

4. Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance Through
Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 973 (2012); Lynn Sharp Paine,
Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 106, 111.
5. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 966-68, 974.
6. Paine, supra note 4, at 112.

2013]

NESTED ETHICS

145

Figure 1

The ethical culture in a law firm thus provides the larger context in
which individual action and the firm’s ethical infrastructure operate.
Ideally, it communicates that a firm is committed to practicing law
consistently with the values reflected in the professional responsibilities
of lawyers. While this can be crucial in strengthening ethical behavior,
there still may be limits to its effectiveness.
First, members of an organization are more likely to be receptive to
its ethical culture as they identify more with the organization.7 An
expanded sense of identity more closely aligns individuals’ self-interest
with that of the organization, so that they see their own success as tied to
the success of the larger entity. Prompting this identification, however,
can be a challenge for a contemporary law firm. Most firms are
extraordinarily fragile, vulnerable to the departure of their most
profitable partners in the lateral market.8 This fragility may make
partners feel that it is hazardous to act as if their long-term self-interest
is tied to that of the firm. In addition, competitive pressures now prompt
many firms to terminate lawyers who are not performing at a level that
the firm deems adequate.9 This heightened vulnerability also can prevent
the formation of any deep sense of attachment to a firm.
A second potential limit to the effectiveness of efforts to promote
an ethical culture is that when individuals in an organization think of
7. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 975, 978.
8. See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 73; see also DAVID
JARGIELLO & PHYLLIS GARDNER, FREE AGENT DYSFUNCTION: MANAGEMENT REALPOLITIK FOR
U.S. LAW FIRMS 12, 17 (2010).
9. See, e.g., JARGIELLO & GARDNER, supra note 8, at 14-15 & nn.15-17.
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ethics, what tends to come to mind is behavior broader than the type that
is the focus of an ethics program.10 For members of an organization,
ethics relates most prominently to how fairly the organization treats the
people who work there.11 Research indicates that there is a strong
connection between this assessment and ethical attitudes and behavior.12
The greater the perception of fairness, the more credible an
organization’s professed commitment will be to ethical values and the
more successful it will be in prompting its members to identify with it.13
This directs attention to policies and practices that we may not even
think of as relating to ethics. They include matters such as promotion,
compensation, and whether people who are generous or selfish tend to
get ahead in the organization.14 These issues relate to the broader culture
of an organization, which in turn affects the ability to promote an ethical
culture. We therefore can conceptualize organizational culture as an
additional component to our model within which the others are nested:
Figure 2

These components are not necessarily sharply distinct. It is
possible, for instance, to regard an organization’s ethical infrastructure
as including its ethical culture.15 Professor Christine Parker and her
10. LINDA KLEBE TREVIÑO & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 221 (2003).
11. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 975.
12. Id. at 978.
13. Id. at 975-78.
14. Christine Parker et al., The Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practices in Larger Law
Firms: Values, Policy and Behaviour, 31 U. N.S.W. L.J. 158, 168-69 (2008).
15. Id. at 160. Christine Parker and her colleagues, for instance, argue for “a broader
conception of ethical infrastructure that incorporates informal management policies and work
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colleagues suggest, however, that in much of the literature on law firms,
“[t]he use of the term ‘ethical infrastructure’ . . . has focused on formal
policies and structures explicitly designed to ensure compliance with
professional conduct rules.”16 Similarly, it is possible to define ethical
culture in a way that includes perceptions of how fairly an organization
treats its members.17 Indeed, one important insight is that an
organization generally does not have a discrete ethical culture that is
distinct from its overall culture. As Parker and her colleagues
emphasize: “All management policies, priorities and initiatives – formal
or informal, and explicitly stated or implicitly assumed – can either
undermine or support ethical practice within a firm.”18 There is simply
culture: the complex and sometimes contradictory set of messages that
an organization sends about what is valued and what is not.
It can be useful, however, to keep the concepts of ethical
infrastructure, ethical culture, and organizational culture distinct. Each
refers to an analytically distinct aspect of an organization’s effort to
promote ethical behavior. As I will discuss in more detail, each directs
law firm attention to different types of policies, and each suggests
different lines of inquiry for scholars.19 Research on ethical compliance
programs, for instance, has distinguished the effectiveness of programs
that emphasize following rules from those that emphasize commitment
to values.20 In addition, differentiating ethical culture from
organizational culture underscores that policies, that we normally do not
think of as related to “ethics,” may have a significant impact on ethical
cultures (not just formal management policies), and the promotion of ethical dialogue and values
(not just compliance with professional conduct rules).” Id. at 160 n.6.
16. Id.; see also, e.g., Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra
note 1, at 692 (“[P]rofessional regulation increasingly depends on the development of ‘ethical
infrastructure’ within firms; that is, on organizational policies, procedures and incentives for
promoting compliance with ethical rules.” (footnote omitted)); Alex B. Long, Focusing Your Firm
on Ethics: Responsibility for a Culture of Ethical Practice and Behavior, TENN. B.J., Dec. 2009, at
14, 15 (defining ethical infrastructure as “the organizational structure, practices and procedures a
firm employs to promote ethical behavior”); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1991) (“[A] law firm’s organization, policies, and operating procedures
constitute an ‘ethical infrastructure’ that cuts across particular lawyers and tasks.”).
17. See, e.g., Christine Parker & Lyn Aitken, The Queensland “Workplace Culture Check”:
Learning from Reflection on Ethics Inside Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 399, 401, 441
tbl.A6 (2011) (including in a survey designed to prompt “individual reflection on the ethical
cultures” of a firm questions about extent to which some respondents agreed that “I am treated with
respect and courtesy in my firm”; “I am treated fairly, in a consistent and predictable fashion”; and
“I am able to openly discuss pay and conditions”); Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and
Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1999, at 131, 131-32
(describing “fair treatment of employees” as a “dimension[] of the organization’s ethical culture”).
18. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 161.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See, e.g., TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 10, at 193, 211-12.
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outcomes. Conceptualizing organizational culture in this way
underscores, for instance, that a lawyer’s decision about whether to
expose the firm to risk, by deliberately ignoring a potential conflict, may
depend on whether the firm offers junior lawyers meaningful
professional training opportunities, and whether it provides income
partners with guidance on how to engage in business development.21
Thus, while ethical and organizational culture may be inseparable, it can
be useful to treat them as two distinct cultures within a firm.
The remainder of this Article uses the concept of nested
components to chart the evolution of law firm efforts to ensure that
lawyers comply with their professional responsibilities.22 It describes in
more detail attempts to accomplish this by developing an ethical
infrastructure and promoting an ethical culture.23 It then discusses
research indicating that an organization’s values broadly defined,
especially those that its members regard as related to organizational
justice, can have a significant impact on ethical attitudes and behavior.24
The Article concludes by suggesting that focusing on ethical
infrastructure, ethical culture, and organizational culture can provide
distinctive and complementary approaches to promoting and studying
influences on ethical outcomes.25
II. THE EVOLUTION OF LAW FIRM ETHICS PROGRAMS
A. Individual Virtue and Informal Advice
When firms several decades ago were smaller than today and were
organized as general partnerships, the assumption tended to be that
informal consultation among partners was sufficient to ensure that
lawyers in the firm behaved ethically.26 Reliance on particular
individuals for advice evolved gradually as people tended to approach
certain colleagues for guidance. The system that emerged was informal
and ad hoc. Partners who developed some expertise in ethics typically
were not appointed to any formal position.27 Nor was there any

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 221-22.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A–C.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.E.
See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 199-20 (2005).
27. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 559, 565 (2002) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors].
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department or committee charged with responsibility for ethical
compliance.28 As one partner put it, the ethics department was “a senior
partner with a copy of the Model Code in his office.”29 Similarly, when a
partner who counseled on ethics issues suggested that the firm should
form a committee, the response tended to be: “What would the ethics
committee do? It would just rubber stamp everything you say.”30
Many firms during this period did not explicitly compensate a
partner who focused on ethics issues for the firm. 31 They relied instead
on a partner’s personal and professional commitment to the firm, and
occasionally on a willingness to volunteer time by partners whose work
for clients focused on professional liability.32 Those who were not
compensated for their efforts spent perhaps 400-500 hours a year on
ethics compliance, almost all of which tended to be reactive. 33 As
Professor Susan Fortney put it in a 1995 survey of law firm ethics
programs, firms seemed to be “more inclined to designate individuals to
handle ethics problems once they arise rather than rely on risk managers
who might be able to take steps to avoid problems before they arise.”34
Concern about conflicts generally was the impetus for regular
attention to ethics issues.35 Even committees that were created to address
ethics compliance tended to be called “conflicts” committees, gradually
broadening their focus over time to encompass other issues.36 There
often was no formal description of the jurisdiction of a committee.37
Ethics partners tended to chair and do most of the work of committees,
which in many firms met only rarely.38 In addition, membership on a
committee often rotated, so that other partners had little opportunity to
build expertise on ethics issues.39 Elizabeth Chambliss and David
Wilkins suggest that this tended to result in lower overall firm
investment in compliance and greater vulnerability to gaps in coverage
of issues.40 Finally, the titles and status of partners focusing on ethics
28. See, e.g., id.
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See id. at 565, 572.
32. Id. at 565, 577.
33. Id. at 574.
34. Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands unto Themselves? An Empirical
Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 275-76, 289 (1996)
[hereinafter Fortney, An Empirical Study].
35. Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, supra note 27, at 566.
36. Id. at 565-67.
37. Id. at 567.
38. Id. at 568.
39. Id. at 570-71.
40. Id. at 571.
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issues varied considerably.41 Chambliss and Wilkins note that a partner
with this responsibility might be referred to as firm counsel, general
counsel or attorney to the firm, ethics partner, professional responsibility
advisor, risk management partner, or loss prevention partner, among
other titles.42
Firms during this period thus tended to focus on individual
behavior as the main object of concern, with minimal effort to establish
and enforce standard procedures to coordinate and guide how partners
conducted their practices.43 Fortney’s 1995 survey of Texas law firms,
for instance, found that most firms did not monitor partners’ compliance
with internal procedures other than those dealing with conflicts and
billing.44 While a significant percentage of lawyers appreciated the
advantages of a firm operating as a coordinated unit, rather than simply a
confederation of independent lawyers, many also expressed concern
about the danger of organizational procedures intruding on individual
partner autonomy.45 Law firm ethics programs during this period
thus tended to reflect the notion that ethical behavior of lawyers
was, as Parker and her colleagues put it, “a matter of individual,
independent judgment in the specific context of their own clients in their
own situations.”46
B. Ethical Infrastructure
In more recent decades, the growth of law firms, exposure of
lawyers to more sources of potential liability, and the growing
complexity of ethical regulation have prompted many firms to establish
more systematic programs to ensure compliance with ethical rules and
promote wider awareness of ethical obligations.47 These initiatives are
commonly described as the creation of an “ethical infrastructure,”48 to
underscore the emphasis on organizational policies and procedures
designed to impose some regularity on how lawyers in a firm practice.49
Not all firms have responded as comprehensively as others, and the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 565-68.
Id. at 565.
Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 699.
Fortney, An Empirical Study, supra note 34, at 284-85.
Id. at 292-94.
Parker et al., supra note 14, at 158.
Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 702-03,

710.
48. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 172.
49. The term appears to have originated with Ted Schneyer. See Ted Schneyer, A Tale of
Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S.
TEX. L. REV. 245, 246, 253, 270 (1998).
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features of programs vary across firms. Nonetheless, there has been a
decided shift toward the adoption of measures at the organizational level
that are aimed at promoting ethical compliance.50
An important component of such an infrastructure is a partner who
is formally designated as an ethics specialist who is specifically
compensated for playing this role.51 Depending on the firm, this person
may work on developing standards for matters such as client intake;
conflicts checks; engagement letters; advance conflict waivers;
voluntary and mandatory withdrawals from engagements; fee
negotiations and terms; the provision of opinions on behalf of the firm;
compliance with practice-specific regulatory regimes; and trading in
securities to avoid insider trading violations.52 The work also involves
responding to bar complaints, disqualification motions, and lawsuits
against the firm.53 In addition, an ethics partner can serve as someone for
lawyers to consult with outside the normal supervisory chain of
command on a matter, which may encourage lawyers to come forward
about potential problems and cloak such communications with the
attorney-client privilege vis-à-vis third parties.54
As they have become more systematic, law firm ethics initiatives
have come to bear some resemblance to corporate legal compliance
programs. Chambliss and Wilkins explicitly suggested in the early 2000s
that law firms look to such programs as models of an institutional
approach to influencing behavior.55 As they note, “research on the
regulation of organizations in other contexts suggests that the
effectiveness of external regulation depends significantly on the scope
and effectiveness of compliance procedures within firms. Thus, the firm
remains the central arena—and agent—of regulation.”56 Compliance
professionals have played a role in defining “best practices” in various
industries, identifying risks of liability, and designing organizational
programs to minimize these risks.57

50. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 178.
51. Id. at 179.
52. Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, supra note 27, at 566-67;
Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 698.
53. Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, supra note 27, at 567.
54. Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of
Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 107, 112 (2008). For a detailed description of the
elements of a law firm’s ethical infrastructure and risk management system, see generally ANTHONY
E. DAVIS & PETER R. JARVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SURVIVAL TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS (2d ed.
2007); Davis, supra.
55. Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 693-94.
56. Id. (footnote omitted).
57. See id. at 706, 715.
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Indeed, many ethics counsel have come to think of their role mainly
in terms of risk management.58 They typically represent their firms in
dealings with insurance carriers, which are apt to regard law practice as
but one of many activities that can pose various types of risks.59 As
Anthony Davis observes:
[A] key component of all insurance has been the management of risk,
and the development of systems to improve the management of risk.
Professional liability insurers have learned that the practice of law is in
this respect no different than a construction site. Just as insurers
require construction workers to wear hard hats, they are increasingly
focused on the adoption by law firms of appropriate risk management
systems, from client intake through practice management. The
availability of coverage, the size of deductibles, the limits available,
the terms of coverage, and the price of malpractice insurance are more
and more dependent on law firms’ ability to demonstrate to
underwriters that they have adopted and institutionalized appropriate
60
risk management systems.

Reflecting the shift in focus from the individual to the organization, risk
management “attempts to put in place a set of standard policies and
procedures that minimize individual discretion and emphasize uniform
responses to specific situations.”61
Law firms that appreciate the importance of establishing an ethical
infrastructure can look for guidance on best practices to an organization
such as the Attorneys Liability Assurance Society or other insurers, as
well as to other law firms. Firms also can adapt the standards for an
effective compliance and ethics program that are set forth in the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,62 and borrow ideas from a
58. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 179-80.
59. Davis, supra note 54, at 100.
60. Id. (footnote omitted).
61. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1962 (2006).
62. The relevant section of the Guidelines states:
(b) Due diligence and the promotion of an organizational culture that encourages
ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law within the meaning of
subsection (a) minimally require the following:
(1) The organization shall establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect
criminal conduct.
(2) (A) The organization’s governing authority shall be knowledgeable about the
content and operation of the compliance and ethics program and shall exercise
reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of the
compliance and ethics program.
(B) High-level personnel of the organization shall ensure that the organization
has an effective compliance and ethics program, as described in this guideline. Specific
individual(s) within high-level personnel shall be assigned overall responsibility for the
compliance and ethics program.
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thriving corporate compliance industry.63
What type of research might scholars pursue in studying law firms’
ethical infrastructure? Chambliss and Wilkins lay out some
possibilities.64 They suggest that research should be guided by an
“institutional” approach to the adoption of compliance programs.65 This
(C) Specific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day
operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program. Individual(s) with
operational responsibility shall report periodically to high-level personnel and, as
appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the governing
authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program. To carry out such
operational responsibility, such individual(s) shall be given adequate resources,
appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate
subgroup of the governing authority.
(3) The organization shall use reasonable efforts not to include within the substantial
authority personnel of the organization any individual whom the organization knew, or
should have known through the exercise of due diligence, has engaged in illegal
activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective compliance and ethics program.
(4) (A) The organization shall take reasonable steps to communicate periodically
and in a practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects of the
compliance and ethics program, to the individuals referred to in subparagraph (B) by
conducting effective training programs and otherwise disseminating information
appropriate to such individuals’ respective roles and responsibilities.
(B) The individuals referred to in subparagraph (A) are the members of the
governing authority, high-level personnel, substantial authority personnel, the
organization’s employees, and, as appropriate, the organization’s agents.
(5) The organization shall take reasonable steps—
(A) to ensure that the organization’s compliance and ethics program is followed,
including monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct;
(B) to evaluate periodically the effectiveness of the organization’s compliance
and ethics program; and
(C) to have and publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow
for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employees and agents may
report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of
retaliation.
(6) The organization’s compliance and ethics program shall be promoted and
enforced consistently throughout the organization through (A) appropriate incentives to
perform in accordance with the compliance and ethics program; and (B) appropriate
disciplinary measures for engaging in criminal conduct and for failing to take reasonable
steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.
(7) After criminal conduct has been detected, the organization shall take reasonable
steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to prevent further similar
criminal conduct, including making any necessary modifications to the organization’s
compliance and ethics program.
(c) In implementing subsection (b), the organization shall periodically assess the risk of
criminal conduct and shall take appropriate steps to design, implement, or modify each
requirement set forth in subsection (b) to reduce the risk of criminal conduct identified
through this process.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2012).
63. See, e.g., Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: The Culture of Compliance (April 23, 2003).
64. Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 702-05.
65. Id. at 702-03.
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maintains that regulatory provisions and potential liability may not be
the only factors that determine if an organization creates an ethical
infrastructure.66 Instead, “organizations take their structural cues
primarily from each other.”67 A company may create an infrastructure if
other similar organizations have done so, regardless of potential liability,
or may not establish one, despite exposure to liability, because
enforcement efforts and internal mechanisms of accountability are
weak.68 Chambliss and Wilkins suggest that the timing of a firm’s
creation of an infrastructure may provide clues about the reasons that the
firm adopted it.69 Research might focus on which firms have been the
first to adopt programs.70 To what extent have they been subject to
regulatory scrutiny or liability? Do their clients operate in heavily
regulated industries? Does the identity of a firm’s insurance carrier
matter? How do firms learn about what structures are being adopted by
their peer organizations?
Research also can attempt to obtain detailed information about the
elements of law firms’ infrastructures.71 These include features such as
the scope of its jurisdiction, how frequently it is used, the formal and
informal authority of the lawyers who manage it, the members of a
firm’s ethics committee, whether they are elected or appointed, whether
membership on the committee rotates, if a firm compensates partners for
serving on the committee, and the scope of responsibility of a firm’s
ethics advisor.72
Chambliss and Wilkins propose that researchers also consider how
to evaluate the effectiveness of a firm’s infrastructure.73 What is its
impact on the daily behavior of lawyers in a firm? One way to gauge this
is to assess lawyers’ awareness of the infrastructure, the extent to which
they use it, and their view of its effectiveness.74 They acknowledge,
however, that there are limits to what outside researchers can learn.75
They therefore urge firms to conduct reviews of their programs to
determine how effectively they are operating.76 This would be consistent
with the provision of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines that
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 703.
Id.
Id. at 707-08.
Id. at 708-11.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id. at 715.
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states that an indication of an effective compliance and ethics program is
a periodic assessment of its effectiveness, accompanied by revisions to
address any shortcomings that this process reveals.77
Some have cautioned that conceptualizing ethical issues as matters
of risk may “put lawyer moral decisionmaking in jeopardy by shifting
responsibility for hard normative judgments to others inside the firm
bureaucracy, such as in-house ethics advisors and committees.”78 As
Anthony Alfieri argues, “[b]y diminishing a lawyer’s individual
responsibility for making moral choices about his role in law and
society, firm-devised risk spreading systems may induce a kind of moral
apathy.”79 Alfieri contends that “the rising dominance of lawyer
malpractice, loss prevention, and professional liability norms and
narratives” can “dilute our professional ambitions and traditions, deform
ethical judgment, and inhibit moral integration.”80
While we need to keep in mind the potential for this risk to
materialize, we also need to be careful not to implicitly compare more
systematic law firm programs coordinated by ethics specialists with, in
Chambliss’s words, “a nostalgic, collective ideal, in which all partners
engage in firm management and collective self-regulation.”81 Substantial
increases in size have made such an ideal unrealistic for many law firms,
and numerous studies establish the crucial role of an organizational
environment in influencing individual behavior.82 Furthermore, as
Chambliss suggests, more robust management controls can expand
awareness of ethical obligations and make them more salient in the
deliberations of individual lawyers.83
C. Ethical Culture
Another concern about law firm programs that emphasize risk
avoidance and compliance with a more elaborate set of rules is that they
may foster a utilitarian approach in which individual conformity to
ethical responsibilities depends on a cost-benefit calculation.84 This is
the approach to the law of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “bad man, who

77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2012).
78. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1909, 1939 (2006).
79. Id.
80. Anthony V. Alfieri, Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of Litigation, Deals,
and Diversity, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 991, 1040 (2011).
81. Chambliss, supra note 26, at 123.
82. See, e.g., id. at 135-36, 141.
83. Id. at 122.
84. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 966-67.
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cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables
him to predict,”85 rather than the substantive values that the law
expresses. For someone with this perspective, compliance with ethical
and legal provisions is a matter not of acknowledging inherently
normative obligations, but primarily a means of avoiding penalties.
Research on corporate compliance initiatives indicates that a
program can trigger this instrumental orientation if it fails credibly to
emphasize the substantive values that the program is designed to
vindicate.86 Such a program will elicit only provisional and contingent
compliance, and may even undercut its basic objective on encouraging
ethical behavior.87 Aggressive monitoring of employee behavior, for
instance, may lead employees to develop an adversarial attitude toward
an organization that undermines motivation to follow rules and
guidelines. In addition, it may subtly affect employees’ perceptions of
their own motivation for compliance, attributing it to a desire to avoid
sanctions, rather than their own desire to behave ethically or in
compliance with the law. This can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy that
leads employees to violate rules when the probability of detection or the
expected penalty is low.
A program also can undercut compliance because of the implicit
signal it may send to employees about the behavior they can expect from
their colleagues.88 If the program relies heavily on monitoring and
sanctions, it may send the message that people generally cannot be
trusted to act appropriately on their own. The expectation that others are
likely to act in their own self-interest may prompt individuals to behave
this way in self-defense, and to frame situations in terms of what
behavior will best further their own interests.
These concerns lead researchers on corporate programs to
differentiate between a “compliance-based” approach and a “valuesbased” approach.89 The former “focuses primarily on preventing,
detecting, and punishing violations of the law,” while the latter “aims to
define organizational values and encourage employee commitment to
ethical aspirations.”90 As Paine describes, organizations that emphasize
values promote a conception of ethics:

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 171 (1920).
Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 974.
See id. at 966-67.
Id. at 968.
Treviño et al., supra note 17, at 135.
Id.
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as a driving force of an enterprise. Ethical values shape the search for
opportunities, the design of organizational systems, and the decisionmaking process used by individuals and groups. They provide a
common frame of reference and serve as a unifying force across
different functions, lines of business, and employee groups.
Organizational ethics helps define what a company is and what it
91
stands for.

Paine suggests that, while corporate counsel may be involved in
designing and implementing this type of compliance program,
management of an organization plays the most critical role in ensuring
that employees internalize ethical values and are intrinsically motivated
to behave in accordance with them.92
A values-based program will necessarily rely to some degree on
policies and procedures that are designed to prevent, detect, and penalize
behavior inconsistent with ethical and legal obligations. If, however, the
organization credibly communicates a genuine commitment to ethical
values and the importance of appropriate behavior for its own sake,
“compliance activities can be perceived as part of an overall system of
support for ethical behavior. Without a strong emphasis on values
orientation, however, compliance activities might be perceived to be part
of a system aimed only at detecting misconduct” because management
does not trust its members to act in accordance with ethical obligations.93
The combination of the two approaches ideally means that when
individuals have to make decisions that are unlikely to be monitored by
the compliance system, they will be guided by appreciation of the
importance of affirming ethical values, not simply of complying with
ethical rules to avoid punishment.
This research thus underscores that an effective compliance
program requires that an organization promote an ethical culture, not just
that it prescribe to a set of rules and procedures with which individuals
must comply.94 While it is possible to conceptualize ethical culture as a
component of an organization’s ethical infrastructure, the two often are
treated as distinct. A focus on ethical culture sweeps more broadly than
the rules and procedures that many regard as constituting a firm’s ethical
infrastructure. It illuminates the informal ways in which an organization
deliberately or unwittingly reinforces or undermines its professed
commitment to ethical behavior.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Paine, supra note 4, at 111.
Id. at 109-11.
TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 10, at 212.
Id.
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How might a law firm take into account research on the importance
of an ethical culture? Parker and her colleagues suggest that a firm with
an ethical culture should promote:
 Awareness and understanding of individual lawyers of:
o Their own personal values;
o The range of different approaches to ethical decisionmaking;
o The standards set out in the rules and law on professional
conduct (trying to follow the rules is just one approach to
ethical decision-making);
o Their own preferred ethical approach (‘ethical position’);
o Day-to-day situations where ethical issues may arise;
o Informal signals in legal practice of the risk of unethical
conduct; and,
95
oThe ability to identify them when they occur.

An ethical culture also supports the “capacity and willingness by
individual lawyers to: Discuss their own ethical position with others in
the firm; Seek to understand the ethical position of others within the
firm; Make a judgment about competing ethical positions in complex
situations; and Act on that judgment.”96 In addition, a firm with an
ethically supportive culture encourages all firm members to discuss with
their colleagues ethical questions about work in the firm. 97 It regards
such discussion as valuable, and it ensures that no one who raises ethical
concerns faces recriminations.98 A firm also should not regularly permit
partners to successfully appeal decisions by its ethics counsel, and
should ensure that profitable partners who violate ethical standards are
not able to avoid penalties for their behavior.
Attention to ethical culture suggests a set of research questions that
are distinctive from, although complementary to, those that are
associated with the study of ethical infrastructure more narrowly
defined. These may include, for instance: Have you ever been asked by a
client to do anything about which you feel uncomfortable? If so, have
you raised your concern with someone in the firm? What was the
response? Who decides whether taking on a matter would create a
conflict of interest with another client? How much do ethical
considerations influence that decision as compared to business concerns?
Have you ever seen colleagues behave in ways that you regarded as
ethically problematic? Did anyone in the firm raise any concerns about
95.
96.
97.
98.

Parker et al., supra note 14, at 184 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 184-85.
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that? How narrowly do lawyers in the firm tend to construe a discovery
request when the issue is whether a troublesome document must be
produced to an opponent in litigation? How has the firm responded when
its lawyers have been found to violate ethical rules? Such questions are
designed to determine, to borrow a phrase from Roscoe Pound, “how
much the law in action [is consistent with] the law in the books.”99
One example of research that focused explicitly on ethical culture
in law firms is the Workplace Culture Check conducted by the Legal
Services Commissioner in the state of Queensland in Australia.100 This
consisted of a survey of individuals in fifteen law firms in Queensland
that posed questions about lawyers’ awareness of the availability of
systems and resources for ethical support in their firms. 101 It asked for
assessments of whether lawyers are encouraged to raise ethical issues,
whether they personally feel that they have the capacity to do so, and
whether the firm responds appropriately when someone raises an
issue.102 Among the questions that the survey included were how
strongly lawyers agreed or disagreed with the following statements:
I am able to discuss ethically complex dimensions of my work with
partners/senior members of the firm
I can talk with others in my firm about the ethical bases of decisions
we make or actions we take
I am able to raise ethical issues in confidence
If I raise concerns, they are given consideration
....
I am able to express honest opinions on issues that may have
serious consequences if others disagree
....
When a conflict arises I know that I will not be under pressure to
put the firm’s interests ahead of the client’s
....
I know where to turn for ethical advice in my firm
I know who can make a decision on the best course of action if an
ethical issue arises for me in my work
103
I am helped to recognize when ethical dilemmas emerge

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 35-36 (1910).
Parker & Aitken, supra note 17, at 407.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id. at 441 tbl.A6.
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Directing attention to ethical culture thus underscores the
importance of fostering a commitment to the professional values that
underlie a formal compliance program.104 In a myriad of ways, an
organization, such as a law firm, communicates to its members how
seriously it regards such values. That message must be consistent with
formal rules for individuals to internalize those values and develop an
intrinsic motivation to behave according to them.105 Ethical culture, in
other words, must reinforce ethical infrastructure.
D. Organizational Culture
Assessing a firm’s ethical culture tends to focus, for the most part,
on the extent to which a firm sends a clear message about the importance
of lawyers complying with their professional obligations in addition to
legal provisions that are applicable to everyone.106 Such professional
obligations generally are set forth in ethical rules, in agency regulations
in some areas of practice, and in common law standards of behavior.107
They relate to duties to clients and to the legal system, and also establish
limits on how far lawyers can go in vigorously representing their
clients.108 An effective ethical culture serves to reinforce a firm’s
expectation that its lawyers fulfill these duties, ideally enhancing
the likelihood that they internalize them in conducting their
daily practices.109
For individuals to be receptive to an organization’s ethical culture
and to use it as a guide to behavior, however, they must feel some
meaningful sense of connection to the organization.110 As Scott
Killingsworth puts it:
When membership in a group is important to us, we identify
positively with the group, forming an emotional commitment to it; we
internalize the group’s values, expectations and norms (or, in a larger

104. See id. at 406.
105. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 965.
106. Long, supra note 16, at 15.
107. See Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 966.
108. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2012) (“A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); id. R. 1.16(b) (“Except as stated in
paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if: (1) withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client . . . .”); id. R. 8.3(a) (“A
lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”).
109. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 971-72.
110. Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work
Settings: The Value of Self Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1303 (2005).
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group, its culture), we become intrinsically motivated to adhere to the
values and expectations that we have internalized, and we govern our
111
behavior within the group by those norms.

Law firms may find it especially difficult to establish this sense of
connection on the part of their members. As Parker and her colleagues
observe: “The increasing degree of mobility in the upper end of the legal
profession – that is, how quickly experienced lawyers move in and out
of the firm – makes it difficult to transmit a positive ethical culture
throughout a whole firm.”112 Some of this mobility is voluntary, but
some of it reflects law firm termination of lawyers who are not meeting
productivity targets.113 This risk of being let go can make individuals
reluctant to identify with and make a commitment to a firm.114
Findings thus far on a research project on which I am working with
a colleague suggest that an important influence on lawyers’ sense of
connection to a firm is their perception of the firm’s broad cultural
values.115 These values come into play with respect to various types of
behavior that go beyond compliance with the ethics rules. They involve
matters such as sharing billing credit, stepping aside to avoid a business
conflict, mentoring junior lawyers, and sharing clients.116 Behavior
relating to these issues contributes to a sense of how fairly members of
the firm treat each other, and the extent to which the firm attempts to
encourage such fairness through compensation decisions and other forms
of recognition and support.117 This, in turn, affects the extent to which a
lawyer identifies with the firm.118
A firm may adjust a partner’s compensation, for instance, based on
how generous or selfish he or she is in sharing origination credits with
others.119 It may reward someone who is willing to relinquish a matter or
a client to avoid a conflict by resolving the next business conflict in his
or her favor.120 It may give compensation credit for time spent mentoring
junior lawyers, and may penalize or reward a partner based on his or her
111. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 971.
112. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 173.
113. Robert W. Hillman, The Hidden Cost of Lawyer Mobility: Of Law Firms, Law Schools,
and the Education of Lawyers, 91 KY. L.J. 299, 303 (2002).
114. See id. at 302.
115. Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Lisa H. Rohrer, Money and Meaning; The Moral Economy of Law
Firm Compensation, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 7, 37) (on file with
Hofstra Law Review).
116. Id. (manuscript at 82).
117. Id. (manuscript at 81-82). On the complex role of compensation in shaping attitudes
toward the firm, see generally id.
118. Id. (manuscript at 55, 81-82).
119. Id. (manuscript at 32).
120. Id. (manuscript at 56-57).
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willingness to share work for a client with other partners.121 It may work
with a lawyer to arrange a schedule that permits him or her to meet
family responsibilities or to deal with health challenges.122 All of these
measures may convince a lawyer that it is safe to act cooperatively
toward the firm and others in it, which can help create a culture to which
people feel a strong connection.
Research on employees’ attitudes toward ethics and compliance
programs is consistent with these findings.123 It indicates that support for
such programs is significantly affected by the perception of an
organization’s overall culture, not simply its ethical culture.124 As Tom
Tyler observes, “people are motivated to align their behavior with the
rules of organizations or groups they belong to when they view those
groups as being legitimate and consistent with their own sense of right
and wrong.”125
Especially important in this process is the assessment of how fairly
the organization treats its members.126 In making this judgment,
employees use a “broad fairness heuristic” to evaluate what Linda
Treviño and Gary Weaver call an organization’s “overall fairness
climate.”127 This takes into account the fairness of how organizational
rewards are distributed: whether people are treated fairly and with
respect.128 These assessments relate to fair outcomes and to fair process,
respectively. Reliance on a fairness heuristic reflects the fact that when
employees focus on ethics they tend to think first of how the
organization treats its members.129 As Tyler declares:
[P]eople who experience justice when dealing with their work
organization first think that its rules are legitimate and ought to be
obeyed. They also feel that the values of their work organization are

121. Id. (manuscript at 78-80).
122. See id. (manuscript at 60).
123. See, e.g., TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 10, at 276-78.
124. See Tyler, supra note 110, at 1303-04.
125. Id. at 1291. Tyler goes on to state that, if employees believe that corporate policies are
“congruent with their own personal moral values,” then:
[T]hey will be motivated by their own moral values to follow corporate rules because
they will see those rules as being consistent with—and developed from—a set of moral
values with which they agree. Thus, they may follow rules in their effort to do what they
feel is morally right.
Id. at 1299.
126. TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 10, at 268-69.
127. Id. at 285.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 268.
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more congruent with their own, so that their own motivation to behave
130
morally leads them to support their work organization.

Thus, the broad values expressed by the organization’s overall culture,
not simply those embodied in its ethics program, can be critical in
prompting ethical behavior.
Why are people’s attitudes toward ethics programs affected by their
perception of how fairly an organization treats its members? Weaver and
Treviño note that social cognition theory suggests that people tend to
store information in general categories, which they use to “interpret
incoming information and to retrieve information from memory.”131 The
ethics category is likely to hold information relating to concepts such as
justice, fairness, rights, and obligations.132 When an organization directs
attention to ethics, “this is likely to cue a cognitive connection with the
ethical issues that are salient to employees, such as fairness in hiring,
promotion, performance appraisal, pay, [and] restructuring.”133
An organization that treats its employees unfairly on these and
other matters provokes skepticism that it is genuinely committed to the
values expressed in its ethics program.134 Individuals who feel such
skepticism will be reluctant to identify with an organization because they
fear that it may take advantage of them.135 As Weaver and Treviño
describe this process:
People must make decisions concerning the extent to which they will
constrain their own interests and identity in light of the interests and
welfare of the organization or other collective to which they belong.
Exhaustive consideration of all relevant information is impossible in
the context of real world relationships between individuals and
organizations. Thus, people inevitably rely on judgmental heuristics to
determine whether to entrust their interests and identity to the
organization and align their goals and behavior with the organization.
Among the factors affecting this decision, fairness concerns appear to
function preeminently. The “fairness heuristic’’ is sufficiently
powerful as to constitute a “pivotal” cognition affecting persons’
136
attitude and behavior toward organizations or other collectives.

130. Tyler, supra note 110, at 1302-03.
131. Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Treviño, The Role of Human Resources in
Ethics/Compliance Management: A Fairness Perspective, 11 HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. REV. 113,
115 (2001).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 115-16.
134. Id. at 116-17.
135. See id. at 121.
136. Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
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An organization that treats people fairly communicates to its
members that they will incur minimal risk from conforming to
organizational expectations.137 It also gives them a sense that there is “no
need to balance the scales of justice by looking for opportunities to
improve their own outcomes at the organization’s expense.”138
Individuals feel that they are valued and that the organization respects
them. As a result, their commitment to the organization can serve as an
important way in which they maintain their identities and further their
interests. Perception of this linkage between individual and
organizational welfare makes it likely that members will take the
initiative to engage in acts of organizational citizenship that go beyond
what their jobs formally require.
The importance of judgments of organizational justice to
commitment to ethics programs underscores the importance of
integrating ethical concerns with the full range of organizational
activities.139 Programs that are created in response to regulation or public
pressure sometimes are treated as self-contained functions that have little
connection to organizational practices relating to planning, budgeting,
personnel policies, and other matters.140 This is problematic because, as
Weaver and Treviño put it, “an ethics program raises the profile of
fairness issues in general (whether or not those issues are explicitly
addressed in the ethics program).”141 It therefore “becomes more
important to see that the ethical ideals are integrated across all
organizational functions.”142
Researchers suggest that increased involvement of human resource
departments in corporate ethics management is especially important.143
These departments generally deal with the issues that employees see as
ethically salient, such as fair hiring, promotion, performance appraisal,
compensation, and the like.144 Perceived fair treatment is closely linked
to ethics in employees’ minds because of the “natural cognitive
association between discussions of organizational ethics and information
employees hold in memory about justice, fairness, and
rights. . . . [A]lthough organizational structures may separate ethics
management from human resources, employees do not.”145
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 10, at 269.
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Weaver & Treviño, supra note 131, at 120-21.
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Id. at 121.
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TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 10, at 288.
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Research by Treviño and Weaver on more than 15,000 employees
in companies with ethics or compliance programs in place analyzes the
link between perceptions of organizational justice and the amount of
observed unethical behavior in an organization.146 Components of the
former variable included the extent of agreement or disagreement that:
the company treats employees fairly, employees think of the company as
fair, rewards are allocated fairly, employees are rewarded fairly, people
get rewards or punishments they deserve, supervisors treat employees
with dignity and respect, employees can count on being treated with
courtesy and respect, consistent ethical behavior helps someone advance
in firm, and people of integrity get rewards in the firm. 147 Examples of
unethical behavior included actions that “might harm the organization or
increase the employee’s inputs,” such as padding expense accounts,
taking longer than necessary to do a job, concealing errors, falsifying
reports, and lying to supervisors.148 The study also examines the
relationship between perceived fair treatment and the extent to which
employees informed management about bad news in the organization,
including ethical violations.149
As Treviño and Weaver report: “A key study finding was the strong
relationship between perceived general fair treatment and ethics-related
outcomes. . . . [A] broad spectrum of unethical actions was significantly
lower if employees believed that their organization generally treated
people fairly.”150 In addition, perceived organizational justice
contributed to a willingness to deliver bad news to management.151 This
is consistent with the idea that perceived justice and injustice can be a
powerful motivation for behavior. A perception of justice moves
employees to reciprocate with helpful behavior, while a perception of
injustice arouses feelings of anger and resentment toward the
organization, and can lead to covert attempts to balance the scales in the
individual’s favor.152
This study reinforces the need for ensuring that the overall values
expressed by organizational policies and decisions are consistent with an
organization’s professed commitment to ethical behavior as reflected in
its compliance program. Treviño and Weaver note:

146.
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148.
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Id. at 277.
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Ethics programs generally are administered separately from other
human resource programs and practices. Therefore, ethics program
administrators have little influence on employees’ broader evaluations
of organizational justice. Yet it is the broader justice evaluations that
had the most powerful separate influence on key outcomes in this
study, explaining 30 percent of the variance in observed unethical
conduct and 52 percent of the variance in reporting. . . . This suggests
that ethics/compliance management should be more tightly coupled
with the management of the broader organizational culture to improve
employees’ perceptions of fairness in the organization in general and
153
in the ethics/compliance program.

The perception of fair treatment incorporates notions of both
distributive justice—fair outcomes—and procedural justice—fair
process.154 Assessment of outcomes reflects the judgment that people
receive what they deserve, based on conceptions of desert that are
appropriate to specific types of decisions.155 Assessment of process takes
into account both how decisions are made, and, more generally, whether
people are treated with dignity and respect.156
Research on procedural justice indicates that people assess the
fairness of the process by which decisions are made separately from the
outcomes that result from that process.157 Those who do not receive an
outcome that they desire may nonetheless accept it as legitimate if they
regard the process that produced it as a fair one.158 Tyler suggests that
judgments about procedural justice are influenced by an assessment of
four different components of an organization’s process.159 The first is the
quality of the decision-making, which focuses on decision-maker
neutrality, the objectivity of decision-making and the extent to which it
is based on factual findings, and whether rules are consistently
applied.160 The second is the quality of people’s treatment by authorities
in the organization.161 This involves the extent to which individuals are
treated with courtesy and dignity, and with a concern for their rights.

153. Id. at 287.
154. Regan & Rohrer, supra note 115 (manuscript at 47-48, 59).
155. Id.
156. See id. (manuscript at 59-60).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Tyler, supra note 110, at 1310.
160. Id.; see also Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 976 (“[O]pportunity to be heard; clear,
understandable rules and decision processes; consistency of management decisions over time and
across cases; articulated reasons for decisions; and application of the same rules to everyone
regardless of position or status.”).
161. Tyler, supra note 110, at 1310.
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People identify with organizations that make them feel respected,
listened to, trusted, and valued.162
An organization can communicate information about the quality of
its decision-making and the quality of its treatment of individuals in two
ways. One is through formal sources such as the rules and structures of
the organization and its statements about values. Thus, an organization
may have a formal grievance procedure that enables employees to
present complaints, as well as a statement that persons participating in
that process are to be treated with respect and that their concerns are
treated seriously.163 A second source of information about procedural
justice is an employee’s experience with supervisors.164 Persons in
positions of authority are constrained to some degree by formal
procedures and policies, but typically have some discretion in how they
apply them in particular cases. Thus, as Tyler observes: “The same
decision-making procedure can be implemented either in a way that
emphasizes the dignity of those involved or in a manner that treats
employees rudely or dismissively.”165
Individuals make assessments of each of the four components of
procedural justice independently of the favorability of particular
outcomes.166 Tyler and Steven Blader’s “group engagement” model
suggests that this is because these assessments provide information that
is relevant to individual decisions about the desirability and risk of
drawing a sense of identity from membership in an organization.167
Groups can provide people with a way of constructing a social identity,
thereby shaping “people’s definitions of themselves and their feelings of
well-being and self-worth.”168 At the same time, identification with a
group can make one vulnerable to negative experiences that damage
identity and self-esteem.169 The group engagement model argues that,
“to the degree that people feel that the group makes decisions via fair
procedures, they are more likely to feel that their identity can be safely

162. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 977.
163. Tyler, supra note 110, at 1310.
164. Id. at 1310-11.
165. Id. at 1311.
166. Id.
167. Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice,
Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 349, 354
(2003).
168. Id. at 353.
169. Id. at 358.
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and securely merged with that of the group.”170 In this way, procedural
fairness provides a form of “identity security.”171
This occurs because a fair decision-making process provides
assurance that decisions will not be based upon stereotypes or personal
prejudices.172 In addition, treating people with respect in making
decisions and in other interactions communicates that a person is valued
by others in the organization.173 This communicates information about
one’s status within the organization and allows for inferences about the
nature of his or her connection to it in the future. The identity security
provided by fair process strengthens a sense of connection to the
organization, which in turn enhances willingness to cooperate and abide
by organizational rules and policies.174
In sum, research indicates that employees’ embrace of an
organization’s ethics and compliance program depends on their
judgments about the extent to which the organization acts in accordance
with broader values to which employees subscribe.175 Whether the
organization is perceived as treating its members fairly is an especially
important consideration.176 This includes providing people with the
rewards that they deserve, engaging in a decision-making process that is
uniform and neutral, and treating people with dignity and respect.177 An
organization that does so signals that an individual can safely derive at
least part of his or her identity from connection and commitment to the
organization.178 This sense of connection motivates an individual to
cooperate with the organization on matters such as abiding by its rules
on ethics and legal compliance.179 As Scott Killingsworth puts it: “In
essence, when managers say ‘ethics,’ employees hear ‘fairness.’”180
E. Organizational Fairness and Law Firms
What are the implications for law firms of the connection between
ethical outcomes and overall firm culture? Most fundamentally,
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 359.
174. Id. at 356. “The key argument of the group engagement model is that people’s level of
cooperation with groups is primarily shaped by the extent to which they identify with those groups.”
Id. at 355.
175. Tyler, supra note 110, at 1302-03.
176. Id. at 1303.
177. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 976.
178. Tyler & Blader, supra note 167, at 358.
179. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 978.
180. Id. at 975.
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awareness of this connection makes clear that what might seem to be
solely “business” or “human resource” decisions, which do not relate
directly to lawyers’ professional responsibilities, may nonetheless have a
significant impact on attitudes and behavior that do.181 These decisions
may involve matters that affect perceptions of organizational fairness.182
They also may relate to matters such as developing a new practice area,
opening an office in a new location, or determining how well the firm
integrates laterals into its operations and culture. This means that firms
must be sensitive to the ethical risks that any given decision may create.
One way to enhance sensitivity to such risks is to conceptualize the
role of law firm general counsel more expansively than many firms
currently do. Responsibilities are divided in different ways in different
firms. Some assign responsibility for professional ethics to the general
counsel; others assign this responsibility to ethics counsel, with the
general counsel playing a broader role as lawyer for the firm.183 It is
unclear, however, even in the latter firms whether the general counsel is
regarded as part of the top management team who weighs in on the
potential legal risks of strategic and operational decisions. This is the
trend in corporate legal departments, where general counsel advise at
least on matters of compliance risk, and increasingly more broadly on
overall enterprise risk.184
Deloitte’s 2011 Global Counsel Report, for instance, indicates that
two-thirds of Chief Legal Officers or senior inside counsel said that
corporate counsel are “now a member of the senior
management/executive team,” compared to 47% who said this five years
earlier.185 Some 42% of global respondents said that corporate counsel is
involved in strategy development, compared to 24% five years ago.186
The percentage was even higher among U.S. counsel, with 51% stating
that this is the case, in comparison to 35% who said so five years
before.187 Regulatory compliance and risk management were the two
most prominent responsibilities of corporate counsel, cited by 75% and a
little over 60% of counsel, respectively.188 Similarly, former Delaware
Supreme Court Chief Justice Norman Veasey and Christine Di
Guglielmo’s recent book on the role of the Chief Legal Officer observes
181. Id. at 981-82.
182. Tyler, supra note 110, at 1304.
183. Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 706-07.
184. DELOITTE, DELOITTE GLOBAL CORPORATE COUNSEL REPORT 2011, at 11 (Inaugural
Global (U.S. Version) ed. 2011).
185. Id. at 2.
186. Id. at 11.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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that “[g]eneral counsel perform the increasingly important function of
assessing legal risks and translating those risks into business terms in
order to facilitate decision-making concerning those risks.”189
Given the increasing legal risks to which law firms are subject, law
firm general counsel arguably should be playing a similar role with
respect to legal risk and compliance. Such risks arise from regulation
under state ethical rules; court rules; common law standards of liability;
some specialized regulation applicable to particular practice areas, such
as banking, securities, and tax law; and generally, civil and criminal
statutes such as those relating to consumer fraud and money-laundering,
respectively.190 Appreciation of the impact of organizational culture on
attitudes and behavior suggests that law firm general counsel should
have a seat at the table at least for discussions about the legal risk that
may be created by firm strategy, policies, and important business
decisions. There also may be an argument that law firm general counsel
should play a role in advising on enterprise risk more broadly, but that is
a subject beyond the scope of this Article.191
With respect to research, positing a connection between
organizational fairness and support for ethics programs is generally
consistent with the research we have conducted to date on our law firm
culture project.192 Lawyers do tend to refer to matters beyond
compliance with ethics rules when they discuss behavior within the firm
that they regard as having ethical significance.193 This behavior can
involve sharing compensation credit; taking time to mentor junior
lawyers; participating in pitches to prospective clients; helping out
colleagues who encounter personal or professional emergencies;
stepping aside to avoid an ethical or business conflict that would prevent
the firm from representing a significant client; and spending time on
189. E. NORMAN VEASEY & CHRISTINE T. DI GUGLIELMO, INDISPENSABLE COUNSEL: THE
CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REALITY 43 (2012).
190. Cf. Regan, supra note 61, at 1969.
191. Professor Fortney, for instance, has made the argument for law firm general counsel to
have a broad role in advising on enterprise risk. Susan Saab Fortney, Law Firm General Counsel as
Sherpa: Challenges Facing the In-Firm Lawyer’s Lawyer, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 835, 840-50 (2005).
For instance, she suggests that it would make sense for law firm general counsel to “advise the firm
on matters related to firm structure, such as partnership, professional corporation, and limited
liability partnership issues”; “monitor compliance with applicable legislation in all jurisdictions
where firm lawyers practice”; “help firm leaders appreciate the role that compensation systems play
in causing people to behave in ways that they are measured and paid”; “conduct or oversee an audit
of employment practices within the firm”; and, more generally, “guide firm lawyers in avoiding and
addressing various legal and organizational challenges.” Id. at 840-42, 847, 850.
192. See generally Weaver & Treviño, supra note 131 (focusing their study on human
resources’ role in “(1) the control orientation embodied in ethics programs and (2) the extent to
which ethics program policies and goals are integrated with other organizational functions”).
193. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 976-77.
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firm citizenship activities such as serving on the compensation or
executive committee, investing time in developing a new practice area,
opening an office in a new location, and helping devise a new training
and evaluation system for associates or a new compensation system for
partners.194 The extent to which a firm encourages and recognizes such
behavior may have a powerful effect on its members’ perception that the
firm treats people fairly. So may a firm’s willingness to help lawyers
balance work and family responsibilities, deal with health problems, or
rebuild their practices in response to market changes.195 How a firm
compensates incoming laterals also can affect judgments about how
fairly it treats its members.196
Research that focused on these and similar issues could enrich our
understanding of the ability of law firms to promote ethical behavior by
their lawyers. At the same time, this research may need to take account
of some distinctive features of law firms and the legal profession. As I
have mentioned, one phenomenon that research on overall law firm
culture may need to consider is that creating and sustaining a sense of
connection to the organization is especially difficult in a law firm
because of the fragility of many of these entities.197 Rainmakers—
lawyers who have close relationships with lucrative clients—can easily
move from firm to firm.198 Their allegiance to any particular firm may be
primarily instrumental, dependent on the support that the firm provides
for the development and expansion of their practice.199 This sense of
connection is contingent and unstable, and may not generate motivation
to guide their behavior by the professional values that a firm wants its
members to internalize.200
Furthermore, lawyers who are not rainmakers may fear that they
will be laid off if the firm’s financial performance declines.201 This
perception that the firm will not be loyal to them can lead them to regard
their own interest as distinct from that of the firm, and to place priority
on pursuing it. It thus may be difficult for a firm to encourage these
lawyers to develop a strong sense of connection to the firm and to
internalize professional values that may constrain self-interest.
Another challenge for firms is that many lawyers exhibit some
distinctive personality traits that can make it especially difficult to
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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encourage them to develop a strong commitment to a firm.202 One is an
especially strong desire for autonomy, on which lawyers tend to score at
close to the ninetieth percentile.203 This inclination is reinforced by a
strong tradition of individual lawyer independence.204 Many lawyers
tend to guard their autonomy jealousy and bristle at anything they
perceive as outside interference that makes them feel like employees.
They may be quicker than others to regard firm efforts to inculcate a
particular culture as efforts to control their behavior, which can lead
them to treat the firm with some suspicion.
Lawyers also tend to rank high on skepticism and low on trust.205
As David Maister suggests, lawyers “are selected, trained, and hired to
be pessimistic and to spot flaws.”206 This means that many of them may
be especially likely to look for self-interest in others, and to question
others’ statements and motives.207 This can make it hard to convince
lawyers that it is safe to identify with the firm and that their cooperation
will be reciprocated. Lawyers also tend to be less concerned than the
average person with building and maintaining relationships with
others.208 Many prefer to work in solitary concentration.209 This may
make them less interested than others in being a part of a cooperative
venture, and in developing a strong connection to a firm. Maister argues
that “the combination of a desire for autonomy and high levels of
skepticism make most law firms low-trust environments.”210
It also may be worth exploring the ways in which law firms are
different from other organizations with respect to the connection
between fairness assessments and support for ethics programs. Research
on ethics in the corporate context implicitly assumes that employees who
do not feel a sense of connection to a corporation must fall back on their
own personal values in determining how to behave in the work
setting.211 That is, they must do without the added support for those
values that identifying with the company could provide. Without this

202. The description that follows draws from SUSAN SWAIM DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW
THYSELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 160-61
(2004); Larry Richard, Herding Cats: The Lawyer Personality Revealed, REP. TO LEGAL MGMT.,
Aug. 2002, at 1, 9 (2002).
203. Richard, supra note 202, at 9.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 4.
206. David Maister, The Trouble with Lawyers, AM. LAW., Apr. 2006, at 96, 98.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 99-100.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
211. See Parker et al., supra note 14, at 183-84.
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assistance, their values could be vulnerable to pressure from self-interest
or animosity toward the organization.
Lawyers who do not identify with a firm, however, might still
identify with the legal profession and its ideals.212 Deriving a sense of
identity from being a member of the profession could reinforce personal
values and make them less vulnerable to being overridden than if an
individual had to rely on those values alone. It might provide a source of
motivation to support a firm’s ethics program that is not dependent on
identification with the firm. If so, a commitment to abide by ethics rules
might exist despite a lawyer’s perception that the firm does not act fairly
towards its members on other issues.
One complication of this account is that the meaning of ethical
rules is intertwined to some degree with a law firm’s approach to
practice.213 Rules are fleshed out as they are applied in specific
circumstances, and a firm may communicate a distinctive interpretation
of their meaning through the accumulation of interpretations by its
members over time. The extent to which a lawyer develops a practical
understanding of his or her ethical obligations thus may be dependent on
the degree to which the lawyer identifies with the firm. If this is so, a
lawyer who identifies only minimally with a firm may not have a robust
conception of the rules that will provide much useful guidance. In any
event, it might be worthwhile to explore the extent to which professional
identity provides a source of motivation beyond personal values that is
not available to other employees.
An additional potentially relevant difference between law firms and
other organizations is that many firms tend to have a more decentralized
authority structure than the typical business corporation.214 While firms
are moving toward more centralized management, it is still necessary for
managers to negotiate with and attempt to gain support from others in
the firm in order to adopt any significant policies.215 Lawyers in a firm,
especially partners, therefore may view the organization less
monolithically than do employees in corporations. Relationships with
other lawyers may be highly important, and the extent to which an
individual regards colleagues’ values as congruent with his or her
own may vary considerably across the lawyers with whom he or she
has contact.
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CONCLUSION

I have framed my analysis as a tale of two cultures in order to
underscore the distinctive implications for law firms and scholars of
distinguishing between ethical culture and organizational culture.216 In
practice, of course, they are not so sharply separate. The overall culture
of an organization sends messages about what is and is not valued with
regard to a number of matters.217 Many of these may affect ethical
attitudes and behavior, even though they seem on the surface not to
relate to what we think of as “ethical” issues.218 Law firm management
therefore needs to be sensitive to the potential ethical implications of a
wide range of practices, procedures, and decisions.219 It may be tempting
to conceptualize ethics and business issues as occupying separate
domains. The lives that people live, however, are more integrated than
this imagery suggests. Appreciating the nested relationships among
ethical infrastructure, ethical culture, and organizational culture provides
a more useful way of understanding the complex influences that shape
attitudes and behavior in the modern law firm.220
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